Resource Nationalism Escalates as AES States Forge New Path in Mining Contract Renegotiations

The Alliance of Sahel States (AES), comprising Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, is dramatically reshaping the mining landscape through an assertive campaign of resource nationalism that has sent shockwaves through the global mining industry. This strategic pivot toward greater state control over mineral resources represents both an economic imperative and a geopolitical statement, challenging decades of foreign dominance in the region’s extractive sectors.

AES Mining Reforms: A Strategic Overview

The AES nations, united under the Liptako-Gourma Charter signed in 2023, have moved decisively to renegotiate mining contracts with international firms, implementing new mining codes that significantly increase state participation and revenue shares. This coordinated approach marks a fundamental shift in how these resource-rich but economically challenged nations engage with foreign mining companies .

Burkina Faso under Captain Ibrahim Traoré has taken particularly aggressive steps, expropriating the Boungou and Wahgnion mines from British firm Endeavour Mining Plc in August 2024. In October 2024, Traoré declared that his country’s resources should “no longer be easily exploited by foreign businesses,” threatening to revoke licenses for Western mining companies. This announcement immediately triggered a 15% stock price drop for Canadian gold mining company Iamgold, which derives 80% of its production from Burkina Faso’s Essakane mine .

Mali approved a new mining code in 2023 that mandates stricter regulations, increased state shares through a local development fund, and restructured duration and terms for mining licenses. The government has demanded 300 billion CFA francs ($512 million) from Canadian company Barrick Mining, citing retroactive fiscal adjustments for 2020-2022. The dispute escalated to the arrest of four Barrick workers, blocked exports, and seizure of approximately 3 tons of gold, leading Barrick to cease operations at its Loulo-Gounkoto complex .

Niger has moved aggressively to assert control over its uranium sector, revoking the mining license for French state-owned Orano to operate the Imouraren mine (one of the world’s largest uranium mines with estimated reserves of 200,000 tons) in June 2024. The government also shut down Orano’s subsidiary Somaïr, which holds stockpiles estimated to be worth €200 million .

Economic Drivers and Regional Context

The AES nations rank among the world’s poorest countries, with Niger’s per capita GDP at just $560 in 2023 and nearly half its population living in poverty. This economic reality contrasts sharply with the immense value of extracted resources. For instance, in 2010, Niger received only 13% of the total export value from its own uranium, despite being a major producer .

Table: Economic Dependence on Mining in AES States

Country	Main Mineral Resources	Percentage of Total Exports	Key Mining Reforms
Burkina Faso	Gold	87.5% ($7.2B)	Expropriation of mines, new tax demands
Mali	Gold	94.5% ($6.3B)	2023 Mining Code, retroactive tax claims
Niger	Uranium, Gold	Uranium: $204M, Gold: $547M	License revocations, export blockades

The region’s economic context helps explain the assertive stance. As noted in a recent report, “Facing gaping budget deficits in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, and stoked by soaring commodity prices, resource-rich countries are bound to demand more from investors in the sector” . This trend is particularly pronounced in the AES countries, where military leaders have tied their legitimacy to delivering greater benefits from natural resources to their populations.

Geopolitical Realignment and New Partnerships

The AES nations have simultaneously undergone a significant geopolitical reorientation, distancing themselves from traditional Western partners and building new alliances with Russia and other non-Western powers. This shift has profoundly impacted their mining sectors .

In April 2025, foreign ministers of the three AES countries visited Moscow to discuss military cooperation, followed by defense ministers meeting with Russian counterpart Andrei Belousov in August 2025 to formalize security partnerships. These developments have concrete implications for the mining sector, as Russia increasingly positions itself as both a security provider and economic partner .

Analysts note that Russia employs a “security-for-resources” model in the region, where military support is exchanged for access to strategic resources. In Mali, after the Wagner Group’s arrival (now rebranded as Africa Corps), Russian-linked companies gained mining concessions in gold-rich sites such as the Fekola and Loulo regions. Similar patterns have emerged in Niger, where Russian state-owned nuclear giant Rosatom is attempting to fill the space potentially left vacant by Orano .

This geopolitical shift has not exclusively benefited Russian companies. Chinese mining firms maintain significant operations in the region, including the Goulamina lithium mine in Mali and Simandou iron ore project in Guinea-Conakry. However, even Chinese companies face increasing pressure to adhere to stricter regulations and local content requirements .

Legal Challenges and Investor Responses

The AES states’ assertive policies have triggered a wave of international arbitration cases, as mining companies seek to protect their investments through bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and other legal mechanisms .

The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) has registered eight mining-related disputes against African states in just six months, half of which are against Niger. Barrick Gold has initiated arbitration proceedings against Mali at ICSID over the Loulo-Gounkoto dispute, though Mali may potentially ignore such proceedings under the pretext of it being a “domestic tax issue” .

Table: Major Mining Disputes in AES States

Country	Company	Nationality	Issue	Status
Mali	Barrick Gold	Canada	$512M tax claim, seized assets	ICSID arbitration
Mali	Resolute Mining	Australia	$160M tax dispute	Executives detained
Niger	Orano	France	Revoked uranium licenses	Operations suspended
Burkina Faso	Endeavour Mining	UK	Expropriation of mines	Assets seized

Legal experts note that mining companies are increasingly relying on investment treaties for protection. “Fiscal stability agreements will prove invaluable,” notes a White & Case analysis, adding that “these agreements are ordinarily enforceable through local courts or international arbitration and also provide useful leverage in negotiations with fiscal authorities” .

However, this legal strategy faces challenges in the AES context, where governments may be less responsive to international arbitration rulings and where political considerations sometimes override contractual obligations.

Future Implications and Regional Impact

The AES approach to resource nationalism is influencing broader regional trends, with other African governments implementing similar policies to increase state benefits from mining. Ghana has established a Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod) with exclusive rights as the sole purchaser, vendor, and exporter of all gold mined in the country. Guinea-Conakry‘s military junta has withdrawn 129 mining licenses, intensifying efforts to reclaim underutilized concessions .

This trend extends beyond West Africa, with 31 African countries having reformed their mining codes since 2014 to increase government and community participation in resource benefits. These reforms commonly include obligations for local mineral processing, stricter environmental standards, and increased mining royalties .

The AES strategy carries significant economic risks, however. Mining investment in Mali declined following implementation of its new code, with gold output falling 23% in 2024 to 51 metric tons. Similar disruptions could exacerbate the economic challenges facing these nations, particularly if they struggle to find technically and financially capable partners to replace departed Western miners .

Security concerns also loom large, particularly in remote mining regions where jihadist groups like JNIM and ISGS systematically extract taxes from artisanal mining sites. The interaction between state-led resource nationalism and insurgent control of mining areas creates complex challenges that neither national forces nor their Russian partners have yet fully resolved .

Strategic Considerations for Investors

For mining companies operating in the AES states, navigating this new landscape requires sophisticated risk mitigation strategies. Legal experts recommend that investors:

• Carefully assess contractual arrangements and fiscal stability agreements
• Reassess project holding structures to ensure optimal investment treaty coverage
• Engage in proactive community relations and benefit-sharing programs
• Consider alternative dispute resolution mechanisms before conflicts escalate 

As Clifford Chance partner Kate Apostolova noted at the Africa Down Under conference, “Money flows where there is certainty. If you have increased geopolitical and regulatory risk, there is less funding to develop the mine” .

Yet despite these challenges, the mineral wealth of the Sahel remains highly attractive. The region contains significant deposits of gold, uranium, lithium, and other critical minerals essential for the global energy transition. With commodity prices remaining elevated and demand for transition minerals growing, the incentive for both governments and investors to find workable compromises remains strong .

A New Paradigm for African Resource Governance

The assertive resource nationalism of the AES states represents more than just policy changes—it signals a fundamental shift in state-investor relations across Africa. These countries are testing the limits of their bargaining power in a changing global landscape, where great power competition and the energy transition have increased the strategic value of their mineral resources.

The ultimate success of this approach will depend on whether the AES nations can strike a sustainable balance between asserting greater control over resources and maintaining investor confidence enough to develop their mining sectors. As Zambian High Commissioner to Australia Elias Munshya noted, “Sometimes there is a feeling that Africa is judged much more harshly than other regions in terms of sovereign risk. Out of 54 countries, maybe four may be troublesome, but there are 50 others that are very safe, politically stable” .

The coming years will reveal whether the AES model of resource nationalism becomes a blueprint for other African nations or a cautionary tale about the risks of rapid contract renegotiation and geopolitical realignment. What is certain is that the rules of engagement between African governments and mining investors are being rewritten in real time, with implications that will resonate throughout global commodity markets for years to come.